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I. THE CHALLENGES OF ENCOURAGING ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT 
There is now abundant environmental law literature that calls for greater flex-
ibility in the legal system to allow for adaptive management.
1
 Climate change is 
one motivator for these calls, though not the only one. But up until this point in 
time, many of the calls for greater flexibility have been fairly general. However, as 
good lawyers and legal scholars know, the devil in law is always in the details.
2
 
Crafting specific statutory language (or principles courts can apply in judicial deci-
sion making) is essential to the success of any legal reform effort.
3
 Effective craft-
ing of specific statutory language can make all the difference between success, and 
failure. Failure can be worse than failure to achieve the proposed reform goals; 
flawed reform efforts can make outcomes worse than they were before. 
I am therefore grateful for the recent efforts by Craig and Ruhl to propose 
specific statutory language to make environmental and natural resources law (and 
administrative law broadly) more friendly to adaptive management.
4
 Indeed, Craig 
                                                          
 * Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law. Special thanks to Rob-
in Kundis Craig, J.B. Ruhl, and two anonymous reviewers for very helpful comments. Any errors and mis-
takes in this article remain mine alone. Craig and Ruhl’s generous comments on this article should not be 
interpreted as an explicit or implicit endorsement by them of any of my proposed amendments or of any-
thing else in this article. 
 1. For summaries, see Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for 
Adaptive Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1, 8 (2014); Eric Biber, Adaptive Management and the Future of 
Environmental Law, 46 AKRON L. REV. 933, 936–39 (2013). 
 2. See Craig & Ruhl, supra note 1, at 14 (“Theorists (including us) have proposed the idea of a 
specialized procedural ‘track’ for adaptive management, but the devil is in the details. Here, we propose the 
details.”). 
 3. Consistent with the theme of this special issue, I assume that legal change is necessary to en-
courage adaptive management. That assumption is, of course, open for debate, and I have explored that 
question elsewhere. See Biber, supra note 1. 
 4. I assume the reader is familiar with Craig and Ruhl’s article and proposed statutory lan-
guage.  Because the focus of this special issue is on adaptive management and environmental law, I will 
also focus my analysis on the environmental and natural resources law aspects of Craig and Ruhl’s pro-
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and Ruhl have even done us the favor of providing a sample model statute. They 
have begun a conversation that is important and necessary. My goal here is to pro-
vide a thoughtful, substantive response to their initial efforts—a critical but con-
structive engagement, similar to what might occur in the session of a legislative 
committee doing a mark-up of a bill. 
As Craig and Ruhl note themselves,
5
 and as I have written elsewhere,
6
 adap-
tive management will only be applicable in a range of decisions. Adaptive man-
agement will not be useful for many, perhaps most, environmental and natural re-
sources decision making.
7
 We therefore need to make sure that adaptive manage-
ment is only used where appropriate.
8
 
Most proposals for making law friendlier to adaptive management call for 
greater flexibility in decision making—which generally means greater discretion 
for the administrative agency making regulatory or management decisions.
9
 The 
Craig and Ruhl proposal accordingly seeks to provide greater discretion for agen-
cies when they are implementing adaptive management. However, in general, 
agencies will often wish to have greater discretion—in other words, fewer political, 
legal, or bureaucratic constraints on their decision making.
10
 
                                                                                                                                       
posal. However, their proposal is drafted to apply broadly to all administrative law decisions—from food 
and drug law to immigration to natural resources. Where I think my comments need to be elaborated or 
adjusted because of that broader scope, I provide more detail in this article. Otherwise, I think my com-
ments have general applicability to their proposal beyond the scope of environmental and natural resources 
law. 
 5. See Craig & Ruhl, supra note 1, at 27 (“[W]e recognize and accept that adaptive manage-
ment is not appropriate for all, or even most, administrative agency decisionmaking.”). 
 6. See Biber, supra note 1. 
 7. I thus agree with a default rule that the agency must demonstrate that adaptive management 
is appropriate before initiating the special track for adaptive management. See Craig & Ruhl, supra note 1, 
at 50–51. 
 8. Evaluating when adaptive management has been appropriately used is a difficult question to 
answer—in part because there is significant debate over what the goals of adaptive management should be 
and therefore whether we can conclude that any particular adaptive management program has been success-
ful. See Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the Institutional Chal-
lenges of “New Age” Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN. L.J. 50, 52–53 (2001) (“Beyond the most 
general level, however, there is no consensus on what adaptive management requires.”).  One goal that has 
been frequently suggested for adaptive management in the literature is the reduction of uncertainty over 
how to achieve management goals. See id. at 52; Craig & Ruhl, supra note 1, at 20 (“The main thrust of 
adaptive management is to reduce uncertainty through integrative learning.”). That goal appears to be a 
primary motivation for the Craig and Ruhl proposal and I adopt it here for purposes of this piece.  Of 
course, if we adopt other goals for adaptive management, then that might change the assessment of when 
adaptive management is appropriate—a change in goals might also lead to other revisions to the Craig and 
Ruhl proposal (e.g., to the findings the agency must make in concluding that an adaptive management 
program is appropriate). 
 9. See, e.g., Craig & Ruhl, supra note 1, at 32–34, 44–46 (describing how judicial review, 
which is intended to cabin agency discretion, can be an obstacle for adaptive management, and calling for 
limits on judicial review in adaptive management implementation); see also U.S. FOREST SERVICE, USDA, 
THE PROCESS PREDICAMENT: HOW STATUTORY, REGULATORY, AND ADMINISTRATIVE FACTORS AFFECT 
NATIONAL FOREST MANAGEMENT 23–24 (June 2002) (“Without more flexible mechanisms, adaptive 
management will remain at best difficult to incorporate into national forest planning and analysis.”). 
 10. See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY 
THEY DO IT 26, 28, 179–81 (1989); Eric Biber, The Problem of Environmental Monitoring, 83 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1, 48–51 (2011) [hereinafter Problem]. For example, the U.S. Forest Service in the 1980s promulgat-
ed a regulation requiring the monitoring of the status of native species on National Forests.  However, over 
time that regulation began to be used by environmental groups to challenge agency decisions based on 
claims of inadequate or nonexistent monitoring.  Some courts held that the agency could not pursue projects 
such as timber sales without adequate monitoring.  The agency responded to this constraint on its activities 
 
2014] NREL EDITION 259 
 
The challenge is to draft a law that increases agency discretion only where 
adaptive management is appropriate. Increasing flexibility and discretion for agen-
cies has potential costs for other important values—including successfully achiev-
ing important environmental and natural resource goals. We therefore want to make 
sure that, if we do pay the costs that flexibility and increased discretion entail, we 
are in fact getting adaptive management that is useful and productive for achieving 
environmental and natural resource goals. We don’t want agencies using sham pro-
posals for adaptive management to simply gain more freedom from judicial review, 
or public participation requirements.
11
 Sham here might mean developing a pro-
posal for adaptive management that is, in fact, meaningless and ineffective, and/or 
developing a proposal for adaptive management for a management or regulatory 
decision that is entirely unsuited for adaptive management in the first place. 
Striking the right balance is even trickier because an assessment of whether 
an adaptive management proposal is effective or is a sham requires significant ex-
pertise and resources. The success or failure of any individual adaptive manage-
ment proposal will turn on factors such as the particular resource being managed, 
the effectiveness of the monitoring program being used to support the adaptive 
management program, the social and economic factors that affect resource man-
agement, the level of risk from a failed regulatory or management decision, and 
many more. These analyses will require significant expertise in a range of technical 
fields (statistics, ecology, chemistry, hydrology, geology, economics, just to name a 
few). Analyses will often be project-specific. An adaptive management program 
that works for salmon restoration in the Pacific Northwest may look very different 
from an adaptive management program that works in the Everglades. And analyses 
will be uncertain—we may not be able to predict very well if a particular adaptive 
management will be successful in the future. 
Where decisions are uncertain, highly technical, context-specific, and re-
source-intensive, courts will generally defer to agency decisions. But under the 
Craig and Ruhl proposal, the agency decision—to adopt an adaptive management 
                                                                                                                                       
by revoking the regulation. See id. This particular example is especially relevant for adaptive management 
because monitoring is a necessary component of any adaptive management program. 
There are exceptions. Agencies may wish to make politically difficult regulatory or management de-
cisions; they can avoid the political cost of those decisions if they can claim that they have no discretion in 
making those decisions (e.g., the court made us do it). See Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 889 (2009).  Of course, the mere appearance of a lack of discretion can serve 
these ends. 
 11. Craig and Ruhl note this risk. See Craig & Ruhl, supra note 1, at 11; see also HOLLY 
DOREMUS ET AL., CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, MAKING GOOD USE OF ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT 3 
(2011), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/Adaptive_Management_1104.pdf; Doremus, 
New Age of Environmental Protection, supra note 8, at 53 (“[The] fuzziness of the concept” of adaptive 
management, “invites the use of the term . . . as an empty symbol. Agencies can use claims of adaptive 
management as a ploy to placate demands for environmental protection without actually imposing any 
enforceable constraints on themselves”). Craig and Ruhl provide some specific criteria in section 3 (for 
example) to evaluate whether an agency adaptive management plan will provide real, rather than sham 
adaptive management. See Craig & Ruhl supra note 1, at 68–74. 
For an example of potentially sham adaptive management, see Martin Nie’s discussion of the Forest 
Service’s proposed revisions to the forest planning rules in the early 2000s.  Martin Nie, Whatever Hap-
pened to Ecosystem Management and Federal Lands Planning?, in THE LAWS OF NATURE: REFLECTIONS 
ON THE EVOLUTION OF ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT LAW AND POLICY 67, 72–73, 76 (Kalyani Robbins, ed. 
2013) (noting how critics of those rules argued that they “used the rhetoric of adaptive management as a 
means to remove standards, undermine [relevant environmental laws], and maximize agency discretion”). 
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program—would produce significantly greater agency discretion. We are asking 
courts to provide deference to agency decisions to grant themselves greater discre-
tion. Agencies therefore may well have a strong incentive to create adaptive man-
agement programs—whether effective or not—to insulate future decision making 
from judicial review or public participation. 
Even assuming agencies always operate in good faith—and I personally be-
lieve that they usually do so—we may hesitate to give this level of power to agen-
cies ex ante. First, agencies may make mistakes in good faith. Agency decision 
makers may firmly believe that they know how to make the right decisions to 
achieve good regulatory or management outcomes, if only they could get those 
pesky, inexpert courts and outside litigants off their backs. Or agency decision 
makers may not even be conscious of how the lure of increased discretion is skew-
ing their decision making to overuse adaptive management. Second, political pres-
sures might come to bear on the agency, forcing it to make regulatory or manage-
ment decisions that it would otherwise refuse to make, or that are in tension or con-
trary to underlying statutes. Such pressures surely already occur, either from the 
White House, Congress, or political appointees within the agency.
12
 But judicial 
review and public participation requirements can provide a significant check on 
such pressures.
13
  We might end up with poor outcomes if political pressures en-
courage or even force agencies to use sham adaptive management programs to 
shield future agency decision making from judicial review or public participation 
requirements. 
Of course, all of these concerns depend on highly uncertain estimates about 
how much agencies operate in good faith, how much agencies will seek to shield 
themselves from discretion, and how important political pressures on agencies are. 
Providing checks and balances to reduce these risks would necessarily undermine 
the whole purpose of providing greater flexibility for the pursuit of adaptive man-
agement—if we have overly stringent review of agency decisions to pursue adap-
tive management, we will undermine the very purpose of the reforms. Finally, any 
assessment of whether greater legal flexibility is worth the costs discussed above 
depends on highly uncertain estimates about how beneficial adaptive management 
will be in the future: How many decisions can adaptive management help improve? 
                                                          
 12. For example, Fish and Wildlife Service decision making under the Endangered Species Act 
was badly compromised by pressure placed by a political appointee, Julie MacDonald. See OFFICE OF 
INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT ON ALLEGATIONS AGAINST JULIE 
MACDONALD, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, FISH, WILDLIFE AND PARKS 2 (2007); OFFICE OF 
INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION: THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
AND THE CONFLICT BETWEEN SCIENCE AND POLICY 2 (2008); Mike Ferullo & Linda Roeder, Fish and 
Wildlife Service Announces Review of Decisions Influenced by Former Official, 38 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 
1685 (July 27, 2007); U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service: Endangered Species Act Decision Making: Testimony 
before the H.R. Comm. on Natural Res., 110th Cong.,  GAO-08-688T (2008), available at  
www.gao.gov/new.items/d08688t.pdf (statement of Robin M. Nazzaro, Dir. Natural Res. and Env’t). 
 13. This is one of the situations where an agency might wish to have its discretion limited in or-
der to protect it from political pressures to make decisions that the expert agency believes are inappropriate.  
For instance, litigation played an important role in limiting the harm caused by Julie MacDonald in FWS 
decision making. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. C 04-04324 
WHA, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49107, 2005 WL 2000928 (N.D. Cal., Aug. 19, 2005); W. Watersheds Pro-
ject v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.Supp.2d 1173 (D. Idaho 2007). 
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How costly will adaptive management be to pursue? How many benefits can adap-
tive management provide? 
Craig and Ruhl’s proposal seeks to strike a balance between providing the 
flexibility needed for effective adaptive management and reducing the concerns 
about the overuse of adaptive management. For instance, they provide for judicial 
review of the agency decision to pursue adaptive management in the first place, and 
limited judicial review of the agency’s adaptive management plan.14 They also pro-
vide for robust public participation in the agency decision to pursue adaptive man-
agement and the agency’s development of an adaptive management plan. But I do 
think it is fair to say that Craig and Ruhl are somewhat optimistic about both the 
benefits of adaptive management for environmental and natural resource decision 
making, and about the willingness of agencies to use their decision-making discre-
tion in good faith. 
I am somewhat more skeptical about the benefits of adaptive management and 
more concerned about the risks of agency discretion.
15
 My proposed amendments 
to the Craig and Ruhl draft bill therefore focus on providing more searching review 
to ensure that any adaptive management plan the agency seeks to adopt is not just 
an effort by the agency to gain more discretion without truly pursuing adaptive 
management. I also try to provide some additional assurances that the costs of 
                                                          
 14. Craig and Ruhl’s proposal provides a range of criteria in sections 2 and 3 by which an agen-
cy’s decision to pursue adaptive management, and the adaptive management plan itself, can be evaluated by 
a reviewing court.  Some of these constraints have more bite than others.  For instance, in order to place a 
project on the adaptive management track, the agency must make an initial finding that the project “deals 
with a complex system.” Craig & Ruhl, supra note 1, at § 2(D)(2)(a). A complex system in turn is defined 
as a “policy-management context in which the relevant social, economic, technological, biological, physi-
cal, and environmental components are numerous, diverse, and interrelated; exhibit feedback between each 
other as conditions change; and adapt to stressors, perturbations, and management measures over time, 
based at least in part on how other components within the policy-management context respond.” Id. at § 
1(G). This definition is broad enough that it seems to encompass many, if not most, of the significant man-
agement and regulatory programs within the federal government. Likewise, the agency is required to find 
that the program “is subject to unknowns or uncertainties about the system, its stressors, and/or best man-
agement practices.” Id. at § 1(D)(2)(c).  It is hard to imagine any significant management or regulatory 
program that does not involve some uncertainty.  
The requirements for an initial adaptive management plan in section 3 are much more detailed, gen-
erally in ways that should be very helpful to encourage the development of more effective adaptive man-
agement plans.  However, they still leave tremendous discretion for the agency to determine which goals it 
wishes to pursue, what risks it wishes to take as it pursues those goals, and how it seeks to achieve those 
goals.  That discretion, combined with the elimination of other substantive constraints besides the legisla-
tion that authorizes the agency action in the first place, gives substantial leeway for the agency.  For in-
stance, Craig and Ruhl’s proposal does not require an agency to consider (for example) the impacts of its 
proposal on endangered species when drafting an adaptive management plan pursuant to section 3.  An 
agency could draft an adaptive management plan that would allow for the extinction of an endangered 
species, and section 3 would exclude the application of the ESA to prevent such an outcome. 1 Perhaps a 
court might conclude that such a plan was inconsistent with the agency’s initial determination under section 
2 to pursue the adaptive management track and the associated ESA analysis for that determination.  How-
ever, this would require a court to conclude that the failure to consider endangered species in the adaptive 
management plan would be “arbitrary and capricious” because it was inconsistent with the original section 
2 determination and its associated ESA analysis.  That requires both (a) a broad understanding of arbitrary 
and capricious under section 6 of the statute; and (b) that any ESA evaluation of the section 2 determination 
was thorough, searching, and specific enough to constrain the agency from causing the extinction of an 
ESA-listed species through the agency’s adaptive management plan.  Given the general nature of the sec-
tion 2 determination, I am concerned this latter requirement might not be met. See infra at notes 24–25 and 
accompanying text. 
 15. See Biber, supra note 1 for a detailed explication of the reasons for my skepticism. 
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adaptive management will be minimal.
16
 In doing both, however, I believe that the 
amendments I suggest would still retain substantial flexibility for the agency, suffi-
cient flexibility to allow for successful adaptive management in most of the cases 
where it is appropriate. 
II. SETTING THE RIGHT INCENTIVES 
If we are indeed concerned about a general desire of agencies to push for 
more discretion, then an ideal set of reforms would on average leave the agency 
indifferent between “normal management” and “adaptive management” in situa-
tions where both might be plausible approaches for a regulatory or management 
problem.
17
 In other words, when considering all of the various procedures, possibil-
ities for judicial review, etc., an agency should not have an incentive to pursue 




This standard is not necessarily in tension with the proposition that we need to 
provide legal flexibility for effective adaptive management. As I have noted else-
where, I believe that what we need for effective adaptive management is not neces-
sarily greater overall legal flexibility, but different kinds of legal flexibility that are 
a better fit for adaptive management than the traditional administrative law sys-
tem.
19
 For instance, we might change the focus for judicial review and public par-
ticipation requirements from one level of decision making (e.g., the day-to-day 
implementation of adaptive management that requires iterative, repeated decisions) 
to another level of decision making (the overall decision about whether and how to 
implement adaptive management). 
The Craig and Ruhl proposal is quite consistent with this model. Instead of 
completely eschewing judicial review or public participation for adaptive manage-
ment, they instead move judicial review and public participation more towards pro-
grammatic-level decisions about whether and how to pursue adaptive management, 
and instead only insulate the day-to-day implementation of adaptive management 
from judicial review.
20
 They also provide the agency with something of a tradeoff: 
                                                          
 16. For a full discussion of the costs, see Biber, supra note 1. 
 17. In particular, we would be concerned about an agency attempting to use the adaptive man-
agement track to obtain more discretion in order to solve problems for which adaptive management would 
be inappropriate. Making adaptive management no more or less appealing to an agency from the perspec-
tive of its overall discretion helps reduce that risk. 
 18. The form and nature of discretion in adaptive management might be qualitatively different 
compared to normal management, so this comparison may be difficult to do, at least at a high level of preci-
sion. Nonetheless, I believe this is a helpful way of framing the institutional design problem, even if we 
cannot exactly measure whether discretion in one category is comparable or equal to discretion in another 
category. 
Of course, agency discretion in and of itself is not necessarily problematic. The problem is the use of 
discretion by an agency to achieve goals that diverge from the relevant statutory mandates. 
 19. Biber, supra note 1, at 962. 
 20. See Craig & Ruhl, supra note 1at 14 (“[B]ecause the adaptive management track accords a 
participating agency more ongoing discretion than typical front-end decision making, we purposely have 
designed our adaptive management track so that an agency’s decision to take it must be considered, deliber-
ate, and— to the extent that procedural constraints can so guarantee—committed to following in good faith 
proper adaptive management procedures.”); id. at 31 (proposing public participation at the “periodic ‘big 
decisions’” about whether and how to conduct adaptive management, rather than for adaptive management 
implementation); id. at 41–44 (same, including judicial review); id. at 66–68 (standard procedures apply to 
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the insulation from judicial review for implementation is paired with specific, man-
datory duties for the agency to conduct ongoing monitoring (an essential compo-
nent of adaptive management) and provide reports to the public based on that moni-
toring.
21
 This is a substantial improvement on the status quo—where courts rarely 
force agencies to conduct monitoring or produce monitoring reports.
22
 
I would make two amendments on this topic. First, Craig and Ruhl focus 
greater scrutiny on the agency’s proposal of whether or not to adopt an adaptive 
management approach; here the agency must comply with all of the various proce-
dural and substantive requirements derived from other statutes, regulations, and 
executive orders (e.g., NEPA, ESA). But they completely exempt the agency’s plan 
for adaptive management implementation from review under those statutes (though 
they still require substantial public participation and judicial review for this stage 
pursuant to their model statute and the statute that authorizes the agency’s project 
in the first place).
23
 
However, the agency decision about whether to adopt an adaptive manage-
ment approach will be a very general decision—it would (appropriately) focus on 
whether adaptive management might help reduce uncertainty and improve decision 
making. It is hard to see how NEPA or ESA review would provide much traction or 
benefit at this stage.
24
 The risk is that NEPA or ESA analysis at this stage would 
                                                                                                                                       
decision whether to pursue adaptive management); id. at 83–84 (judicial review applies to decision whether 
to pursue adaptive management); see Craig & Ruhl, supra note 1 at 68 (public participation requirements 
for development of adaptive management plan); id. at 83–84 (allowing for judicial review of adaptive man-
agement plan); id. at 84 (exempting implementation of adaptive management plans from most judicial 
review). 
 21. See Craig & Ruhl, supra note 1, at 31, 53, 71. 
 22. See Problem, supra note 10, at 60–65. 
 23. See Craig & Ruhl, supra note 1, at 49, 54–55 (proposing heightened public participation for 
the development of an adaptive management plan, but exempting review of those plans “from the substan-
tive and procedural requirements of any statutes, regulations, or executive orders other than the statute that 
authorized the agency to engage in the relevant management activities in the first place”); id. at 74 (exempt-
ing development of adaptive management plan from procedural and substantive requirements except for 
statute that authorizes the relevant management decision). Craig and Ruhl state that this exemption “is 
intended to provide agencies with an incentive for engaging in the rigorous process of adaptive manage-
ment planning and implementation.” Id. at 55. 
 24. For instance, there have been a number of trenchant critiques (from both outside and within 
the agencies) of the utility of NEPA and ESA analysis in the context of oil and gas leasing and land use 
planning by land management agencies. The criticism is that both leases and plans provide inadequate 
specificity about the particular activities that the lessee or the agency might pursue in the future, making the 
NEPA and ESA process either ineffective (because they are overly vague), overly burdensome (because 
they seek to analyze a wide range of possible future activities), or both. See, e.g., Jan G. Laitos, Paralysis by 
Analysis in the Forest Service Oil and Gas Leasing Program, 26 LAND & WATER L. REV. 106 (1991); 
Marla E. Mansfield, Through the Forest of the Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Controversy toward a Para-
digm of Meaningful NEPA Compliance, 24 LAND & WATER L. REV. 86, 124 (1989) (noting “the fear that if 
NEPA procedures are grafted onto indefinite or abstract activities, NEPA would founder” because “[o]nly 
theoretical impacts of potential impacts from differing levels of activity will result”); Michael J. Gippert & 
Vincent L. DeWitte, The Nature of Land and Resource Management Planning Under the National Forest 
Management Act, 3 ENVTL. L. 149, 175–77 (1996) (arguing for greater use of ESA review at the site-
specific, rather than plan level, for Forest Service decision making because “it allows the Forest Service to 
assimilate new information into concrete project decisions”); National Forest System Land Management 
Planning, 72 Fed. Reg. 48,514, 48,524 (Aug. 23, 2007) (Forest Service statement that conducting a full 
NEPA analysis for planning documents “was impractical, inefficient sometimes inaccurate, and not helpful 
with the plan decision making process” and that “the Agency has concluded that environmental impacts of 
projects and activities cannot be meaningfully evaluated without knowledge of the specific timing and 
location of the projects and activities”); id. at 48,525–26 (“Meaningful analysis of the effects of a plan is not 
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turn into bland generalities that do little to inform decision makers and even less to 




In contrast, the second stage, where an adaptive management plan is devel-
oped, would provide many more details—what kinds of management options might 
be used; how the management program will specifically reduce uncertainty; what 
environmental resources will be covered by the monitoring program; what possible 
risks to various environmental resources the proposed management options might 
create; what triggers to use to determine whether the adaptive management pro-
gram should be terminated, etc. It is here that there are sufficient specifics to allow 
for a fruitful NEPA or ESA review that can actually examine (for example) wheth-
er the specific management options being considered in the adaptive management 
plan would jeopardize the existence of endangered species. Moreover, more de-
tailed, specific review at this stage is more likely to separate sham from effective 
adaptive management proposals, and thus reduce the risk that agencies are using 
the cover of adaptive management to acquire increased discretion. Thus, I would 
propose that the second stage of the adaptive management process developed by 
Craig and Ruhl be also covered by all relevant procedural and substantive require-
ments that would otherwise apply to agency action.
26
 
                                                                                                                                       
possible because plan components typically cannot be linked in a cause-effect relationship over time and 
within a geographic area to effects on the human environment.  This cause-effect relationship is lacking 
when plans do not include proposals for actions that approve projects and activities.”); National Environ-
mental Policy Act Documentation Needed for Developing, Revising, or Amending Land Management 
Plans; Categorical Exclusion, 70 Fed. Reg. 1062, 1062–63 (Jan. 5, 2005) (similar discussion in Forest Ser-
vice proposal of categorical exclusion of forest plans from NEPA review) (“[I]t is usually infeasible to do 
meaningful environmental analysis for a national forest as a whole that is sufficiently site specific to allow 
projects to be carried out without further detailed NEPA analysis.”); National Environmental Policy Act 
Documentation Needed for Developing, Revising, or Amending Land Management Plans; Categorical 
Exclusion, 71 Fed. Reg. 75481, 75,482–84 (Dec. 15, 2006) (similar discussion in Forest Service announce-
ment of final decision on categorical exclusion). Indeed, the Forest Service has argued that, in promoting 
adaptive management, site-specific review is more effective than programmatic NEPA review. National 
Forest System Land Management Planning, 72 Fed. Reg. at 48,525. 
 25. Another risk from premature NEPA and ESA analysis is that it might lead to less predictable 
judicial review. Where proposed agency actions are rather vague, the scope of the agency action may be 
difficult to determine. See Laitos, supra note 24, at 114 (noting that questions of scope are “exceptionally 
difficult to answer in the case of federal onshore oil and gas leasing” given the uncertainty of site-specific 
actions and impacts). Thus, there is a wide latitude for litigants and courts to identify different ways to make 
the analysis more specific in particular areas (i.e., to challenge the scope of the review of the action). Later 
environmental review might in fact be preferable from an agency’s perspective. This is, in fact, consistent 
with efforts by the Forest Service to move environmental review away from its planning process and more 
toward site-specific, project-level decision making, such as the 2005 and 2008 proposed revisions to the 
Forest Service planning rules. See Nie, supra note 11, at 72–73. 
 26. If we are concerned that this would create a substantial burden on the agency that might de-
ter the pursuit of adaptive management, one could exempt the first stage—whether to pursue adaptive man-
agement—from these procedural and substantive requirements. One could even make the first stage deci-
sion unreviewable in court. This would offset to some extent the increased burden of full compliance with 
these requirements at the second stage, though not entirely, since the greater specificity of the second stage 
means compliance will be more thorough and therefore more burdensome. Such a switch seems to me 
likely to produce a substantial gain in useful information and accountability for the agency (with the height-
ened review for the second stage) with relatively small costs (with the lessened review at the first stage). 
Again, the generality of the first stage decision about whether to pursue adaptive management likely means 
that any analysis will be of limited utility—both in terms of information production and in terms of ac-
countability. 
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Thorough environmental review of an adaptive management plan can be chal-
lenging, even with the additional specifics at this second stage. Adaptive manage-
ment necessarily requires flexibility for management or regulatory changes to re-
spond to new information or to produce new information. That means that the 
adaptive management plan will necessarily have limits on the specifics that can be 
evaluated. Nonetheless, there are elements of the plan that will allow for evalua-
tion. For instance, trigger mechanisms in the adaptive management plan to reduce 
or prevent irreversible harm to vital resources (e.g., endangered species) can pro-
vide sufficient information to allow for a range of analyses (e.g., ESA consulta-
tion).
27
 The overall cost of an adaptive management program can usually be esti-
mated, and provide the basis for any mandatory cost-benefit analyses. 
Indeed, many of these additional analyses will dovetail nicely with other find-
ings that should be essential to any determination that a proposed adaptive man-
agement plan will provide effective adaptive management. ESA consultation, for 
instance, can assure that the plan truly is minimizing the risk of irreversible harm to 
endangered species—and reducing the risk of irreversible harm is one factor that is 
generally agreed to be an essential component of any effective adaptive manage-
ment plan.
28
 Cost-benefit analysis might help us determine whether an adaptive 
management plan will produce useful information at a cost that we are willing to 
pay—again, if the social costs of an adaptive management plan exceed its benefits, 
we should not be pursuing it in the first place.
29
 Review at this stage is therefore an 
important double-check to ensure that the adaptive management plan that the agen-
cy proposes will fulfill the promises the agency has made in its initial proposal to 
proceed on the adaptive management track. 
Second, I would switch the default for renewing adaptive management pro-
grams—at least after a certain period of time after the initial adaptive management 
program is adopted. Currently, the Craig and Ruhl proposal requires the agency to 
justify its departure from the adaptive management track after the initial adaptive 
management plan has ended.
30
 In other words, the burden is on the agency to ter-
minate adaptive management for a particular regulatory or management problem. 
Any subsequent plan must be based on the agency’s monitoring data and conclu-
sions from the previous iteration of the adaptive management program.
31
 
Again, a key question is how easy it is for the agency to continue on the adap-
tive management track, with its significant protection from judicial review and pub-
lic participation. Under the Craig and Ruhl proposal, the burden would be on chal-
lengers to convince a court that the agency should not continue on the adaptive 
                                                          
 27. For a discussion of the important role that triggers might play in adaptive management, see 
MARTIN NIE & COURTNEY SCHULTZ, DECISION MAKING TRIGGERS IN ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT, REPORT 
TO USDA PACIFIC NORTHWEST RESEARCH STATION, NEPA FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2011).  
 28. Craig & Ruhl, supra note 1, at 19; see also Biber, supra note 1, at 947. 
 29. See Biber, supra note 1, at 946–47; Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Infor-
mation Problem, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1455, 1479 (2011); Eli P. Fenichel & Gretchen J.A. Hansen, The Oppor-
tunity Cost of Information: An Economic Framework for Understanding the Balance Between Assessment 
and Control in Sea Lamprey (Petromyzon marinus) Management, 67 CAN. J. FISH. AQUAT. SCI. 209, 210 
(2010) (providing a model analyzing whether adaptive management would be worth the costs in terms of 
additional information gained). 
 30. See Craig & Ruhl, supra note 1, at 60, 75 § 4(A). 
 31. See id. at 77, § 4(B)(3)(b). 
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management track. My proposal would be to flip the burden of proof after a certain 
period of time has passed, requiring the agency (as with the initial proposal for 
adaptive management and the initial adaptive management plan) at least every six 
years to demonstrate that adaptive management is still the appropriate choice and 
that the adaptive management plan will be effective. This of course raises the cost 
to the agency of continuing adaptive management—ensuring that the agency will 
only pursue adaptive management if it believes that adaptive management contin-
ues to be the best way to achieve regulatory or management goals. It also reduces 
the risk that once regulatory or management programs enter onto the adaptive man-
agement track they will stay there forever—regardless of whether adaptive man-
agement is indeed improving decision making—simply because the agency wishes 
to shield its program from extensive judicial review or public participation re-
quirements.
32
 Requiring the review to be every six years—rather than after each 
adaptive management plan expires—allows for the agency to use short-time frame 
adaptive management plans (e.g., one- or two-year plans) without the burden of 
having to redo their analysis every time. This creates some incentive for agencies to 
consider more frequent revisions of those adaptive management plans without trig-
gering burdensome review and consultation requirements. 
III. ENSURING EFFECTIVE AND EXPERT REVIEW OF ADAPTIVE 
MANAGEMENT PROPOSALS 
As noted above, one of the challenges in evaluating whether adaptive man-
agement is appropriate for a particular program and will be successful in improving 
decision-making outcomes is the significant level of expertise that is required to 
evaluate adaptive management programs. The risk is that because of this require-
ment for expert assessment, courts will simply defer to an agency’s adaptive man-
agement proposal or plan—even though this deference will make it easier for an 
agency to gain additional discretion in future decision making. 
How should the problem of ensuring thoughtful and effective review of agen-
cy decision making by courts when courts do not have any expertise in the area be 
addressed? In the context of endangered species protection, one solution that has 
been developed is to have the original agency decision reviewed by another agency 
that has expertise in the areathe U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.33 We thereby 
                                                          
 32. Craig and Ruhl’s proposal includes a provision in which agencies could terminate an adap-
tive management program if the agencies conclude that the program is not effective.  While this provision 
seems eminently sensible, it is also questionable how much an agency will invoke this provision.  Again, if 
agencies generally value the increased discretion that the adaptive management track provides, they may be 
reluctant to voluntarily terminate an adaptive management program even if it is not proving effective. Given 
what I believe to be an agency’s general reluctance to terminate adaptive management programs and their 
associated discretion, I would provide less searching judicial review of agency decisions to terminate adap-
tive management programs than Craig and Ruhl would—specifically, I would not require the agency to 
provide “clear and convincing evidence” that the requirements for termination have been met.  
Consistent with flipping the default rule for an agency decision to renew an adaptive management 
program, I would not require an agency that terminates an adaptive management program to “immediately 
proceed to adopt a new adaptive management program,” as is currently mandated in the Craig and Ruhl 
proposal. Craig & Ruhl, supra note 1 at 80, § 5(B). 
 33. There is unfortunately no comprehensive study that I am aware of that explores the extent to 
which section 7 consultation results in the production of additional information about endangered species. 
Certainly the process has the potential to produce more information. See Holly Doremus, Lessons Learned, 
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ensure some thoughtful, independent review of the original decision by an agency 
that has more expertise in the particular area than a reviewing court would. If the 
independent review determines that the project meets the relevant standards, courts 
would apply their usual deference; if not, then courts might apply a heightened 
standard of review to the agency decision. 
Of course, this additional stage adds costs and delays to the decision as to 
whether and how to pursue adaptive management. But if this review is limited to 
only the programmatic stages (such as the development of the adaptive manage-
ment plan), those costs and delays are relatively limited. Moreover, the expert re-
view by an outside party may make judicial review easier or quicker since the court 
can rely on a thoughtful, independent review—as opposed to the possibly self-
interested analysis of either the agency or the outside parties challenging the agency 
decision. 
There are other ways in which an outside expert body might facilitate the 
adaptive management process—both ensuring greater accountability and possibly 
also streamlining the process as well. First, the outside body might have the power 
to develop guidelines or regulations to define key terms, provide more specific 
guidance as to the key concepts relevant for adaptive management, and provide 
best practices about adaptive management implementation. The model here would 
be the Council on Environmental Quality guidelines for NEPA. Of course, given 
the context-specific nature of effective adaptive management, any such guidelines 
will be fairly general (as are the CEQ NEPA guidelines), but they may be nonethe-
less helpful. They could also create a structure or mandate for individual agencies 
to draft their own specific guidelines for adaptive management proposals and 
plansagain similar to the CEQ guidelines, which require individual agencies to 
develop their own NEPA regulations. These guidelines could help provide more 
specificity for judicial review of adaptive management proposals and plansagain 
this can produce multiple benefits, including making judicial review quicker, easi-
er, and more predictable, producing more accurate determinations of whether adap-
                                                                                                                                       
in THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY: RENEWING THE CONSERVATION PROMISE 195, 205 (Dale 
D. Goble et al. eds. 2006). For a discussion of the role that the ESA in general has played in producing 
improved information about endangered species, see Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with 
the Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 20–22, 55–57 (2009) [hereinafter 
Too Many Things to Do] (discussing how ESA consultation and litigation produced improved outcomes for 
and information about old-growth forest-dependent species in the Pacific Northwest); Eric Biber & Berry 
Brosi, Officious Intermeddlers or Citizen Experts? Petitions and Public Production of Information in Envi-
ronmental Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 321, 36570 (2010) (discussing how citizen petitions in the ESA listing 
process can produce additional information); Randy Molina et al., Protecting Rare, Old-growth, Forest-
Associated Species Under the Survey and Manage Program Guidelines of the Northwest Forest Plan, 20 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 306 (2006) (describing a large-scale survey program for old-growth forest-
dependent species that was initiated in response to ESA and other litigation over Forest Service manage-
ment in the Pacific Northwest). 
Another example of how outside review may produce additional information about difficult prob-
lems is the requirement that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review all major federal regula-
tions to determine the costs and benefits of those regulations. That review process has produced more in-
formation about the costs of regulations. See Too Many Things to Do, supra, at 6. 
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tive management proposals and plans will truly be effective, and ensuring more 
accountability for agency decisions to pursue adaptive management.
34
 
Those guidelines may have additional benefits as well: as with environmental 
review pursuant to NEPA in the 1970s, we are still exploring how adaptive man-
agement will be implemented in practice by management and regulatory agencies. 
The development of guidelines that flesh out how adaptive management will work 
for agencies in practice can be extremely helpful in articulating minimum standards 
for what is effective adaptive management, identifying and disseminating best prac-
tices, and ensuring rigorous application by individual agencies. Again, this is to 
some extent what the CEQ NEPA guidelines have done for the practice of envi-
ronmental review within the federal government for all agencies. 
A final role for an outside agency might be to intervene during implementa-
tion of an adaptive management program if the program is proving ineffective or if 
the implementing agency is not truly implementing the program. Craig and Ruhl 
rightfully attempt to shield agency implementation of adaptive management pro-
grams because of the need for flexibility and frequent changes in decision mak-
ing—and their proposal does produce a few safety valves for the agency, or outside 
parties, to seek to terminate the program if it is ineffective or unimplemented.
35
 
However, a heavy reliance on the agency to terminate adaptive management pro-
grams that are failing might be problematic, given the potential attractiveness to the 
agency of the shelter the adaptive management rack receives from judicial review 
or public participation. Similarly, a heavy reliance on outside parties to terminate 
failing adaptive management programs is troublesome because outside intervention 
will rapidly increase costs and delays, fundamentally undermining the benefits of 
the adaptive management track. Outside parties also will have their own agendas—
they may challenge adaptive management implementation not because of any prob-
lems with the adaptive management program per se, but because they wish to ob-
struct or alter the substance of the implementing agency’s decision making (regard-
less of whether it is adaptive or not). 
Craig and Ruhl’s proposal attempts to strike this balance by setting the bar 
very high for a successful challenge to an agency’s implementation of adaptive 
management.
36
 But that bar may be so high that the possibility of outside interven-
tion might be extremely small, too small to be effective.
37
 Moreover, again the 
                                                          
 34. See Craig & Ruhl, supra note 1, at 34 (arguing that by providing concrete guidelines for 
what an adequate adaptive management program entails, legislation can make it easier for courts to identify 
“legitimate adaptive management from imposters”). 
 35. See id. at 45, 56 (noting need for “escape valve” from adaptive management program due to 
changed circumstances, ineffectiveness, or failure to implement but also stating that any such escape valve 
should be “tightly controlled” to reduce the risk of undermining the flexibility needed for effective adaptive 
management). 
 36. See id. at 45 (noting need for a heavy burden of proof and strict standard for judicial action 
in response to requests to terminate adaptive management programs). 
 37. One way the bar is set high is requiring plaintiffs to provide “clear and convincing evidence” 
that an adaptive management program must be terminated. Id. at 80–82 § 5(D), (E). 
Likewise, the standard for a plaintiff to demonstrate that the agency has failed to implement an adap-
tive management program or associated monitoring reports is quite high. See id. at 866 § 6(G)(7) (§ 5(D)–
(E), allowing an agency to continue with an adaptive management program as long as it “has undertaken 
any other activity within the last two (2) years that indicates that it has not completely abandoned the adap-
tive management program”); id. at 86 §6(G)(4) (allowing agency to defeat a plaintiff’s challenge if it shows 
that it has “released monitoring data to the public at least once in the last two (2) years”). By setting the bar 
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problem of expertise is present here—how is a court lacking in expertise supposed 




Again, an outside agency provides the possibility of expertise, relative impar-
tiality, and a gatekeeper role. The outside agency can bring expertise to determine 
whether an adaptive management program should be terminated or not; it brings 
impartiality (at least with respect to the dispute between the agency and any third-
parties), since its discretion is not at stake in the determination of whether to termi-
nate the program; and it can serve an important gatekeeper role, screening out 
frivolous complaints, or complaints that are based on criticisms of the underlying 
substance of the implementing agency’s decision making, rather than on criticisms 
of whether the adaptive management program is working. Petitions for terminating 
or changing an ongoing adaptive management program might be first directed to 
this outside agency, which could review them and make an initial determination as 
to their validity; petitions could then be reviewed by the courts under the same ex-
tremely deferential standards of review (but with presumably less deference if the 
outside agency concluded that they petition had validity).
39
 
What agency might serve in this supervisory role for adaptive management? 
A new agency could be created, with a focus on adaptive management. Creating a 
new agency would have the advantage of also jumpstarting the process of creating 
a formal home for adaptive management in the federal government—a place where 
the practice and theory of adaptive management can be honed, articulated, and 
spread throughout the federal government. On the other hand, creating a new agen-
cy increases the difficulty of getting any legislation enacted in the first place.
40
 
                                                                                                                                       
so high for showing a failure to comply, there is a risk that an agency will be able to provide “sham compli-
ance” to avoid judicial intervention. For instance, would a monitoring report that simply provides a state-
ment that no monitoring data has been collected suffice under this standard? Would an agency be able to 
demonstrate that a single, small implementation action is enough to foreclose judicial review—for instance, 
in a program to control non-native fish, would one staff member going out for five minutes one day to try 
and catch non-native fish with a net be adequate? I would amend the provisions in § 6(G) to clarify that 
more than trivial compliance with the mandates is required. 
 38. Craig and Ruhl’s proposal allows for termination of the adaptive management program for 
“severe disruptions,” but this category is “limited to events such as natural disasters, economic collapses, or 
acts of war or terrorism.” See id. at 80–82. This definition appears overly narrow. For instance, it appears to 
exclude the introduction of a new non-native species that is highly invasive, and highly damaging to one of 
the resources covered by the adaptive management program. This would seem to be the kind of event that 
would also warrant revisiting the adaptive management program and that might not have been considered in 
the original program. I would revise the definition of “severe disruption” to “changes in the complex system 
being managed that were not identified or anticipated in the currently applicable adaptive management plan 
and that are likely to result in significant risks of major and irreversible harm to important components of 
the complex system being managed by the adaptive management program.” 
 39. It seems likely that if this outside agency found the petition to have validity, the agency do-
ing adaptive management implementation might take its own steps to correct the problems, foreseeing 
potentially troublesome litigation on the horizon. This might save all parties the time and cost of litigation. 
 40. Another issue related to the creation of a new agency is whether the mission of an adaptive-
management specific agency would facilitate, or hinder, the production of helpful information for the eval-
uation of agency adaptive management plans. It is possible that an agency that only focuses on adaptive 
management and is staffed with adaptive management experts might see its role as being a “booster” of 
adaptive management, encouraging the proliferation of adaptive management throughout various agencies. 
Such an agency might provide overly optimistic assessments of the quality of proposed adaptive manage-
ment plans. On the other hand, it is also possible that the staff of such a specialized agency might see its 
mission as trying to maximize the quality of adaptive management plans and encouraging excellence in 
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Another possibility is to make CEQ a possible locus for this supervisory 
role—at least initially. It has a significant amount of experience with environmental 
review processes, which raise many similar issues to adaptive management.
41
 It has 
experience supervising compliance with environmental decision-making proce-
dures by a wide range of agencies. A major weakness of relying on CEQ is that it 
has a small staff and has limited area-specific expertise (environmental).
42
 It is pos-
sible that with a modest increase in budget, CEQ could add the necessary staff and 
expertise. Another concern with relying on CEQ is its location within the White 
House—it may be overly susceptible to political pressure, including budget cuts 
from a hostile President. Finally, CEQ only focuses on environmental issues while, 
as Craig and Ruhl note, adaptive management has the potential to help with a much 
broader range of government decisions.
43
 However, many of the current issues and 
proposals for adaptive management are in the environmental and natural resources 
arena. Thus, in terms of the subject matter where the adaptive management track is 
most likely to be used initially, where the most difficulties of early applications are 
likely to arise and existing expertise is strongest, it might make sense to have CEQ 
take an initial, transitional role in setting up the framework for adaptive manage-
ment in the federal government. As adaptive management expands into other areas 
of decision making (hopefully because it has been successful), then we might tran-
sition this role to another, perhaps new, agency.
44
 
A third option for outside review would be to rely on ad hoc panels for peer 
review, instead of creating a new organization to provide review. Agencies that 
propose adaptive management programs would be required to obtain peer review of 
those programs. Peer reviewers might be assembled through the National Academy 
of Sciences, the U.S. Geological Survey, or through a specialized advisory board 
(as is done for a range of EPA decisions). Peer review might also be used for peri-
odic review of existing adaptive management programs and claims that an existing 
program should be terminated. Special ad hoc panels might also be convened to 
draft overall guidelines and to revise those guidelines on a periodic basis. Ad hoc 
panels obviate the need for a significant investment to create a new agency to con-
duct reviews; they also avoid the risk that adding reviews to an existing agency 
(like CEQ) will be ineffective because the existing structure, mission, and priorities 
                                                                                                                                       
those plans. Certainly there are examples of adaptive management scholars who have been thoughtfully 
critical of the implementation of adaptive management and the implementation of ineffective adaptive 
management plans by agencies. See, e.g., David A. Keith et al., Uncertainty and Adaptive Management for 
Biodiversity Conservation, 144 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 1175, 1178 (2011) (discussing examples of 
problematic adaptive management implementation). Thus, if we create a separate agency, it is vital that 
those who setup the new agency encourage a culture of excellence in adaptive management implementa-
tion. 
 41. Specifically, environmental review processes require the collection, analysis, and presenta-
tion of information about the environment. Likewise, at the heart of adaptive management is a determina-
tion about whether more information is needed for decision making, how to obtain that information through 
management options and monitoring, and how to analyze it for future decision making. 
 42. CEQ in 2012 had a budget of about $3 million and a staff of 24. See Fiscal Year 2013: Con-
gressional Budget Submission, EXECUTIVE OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, CEQ-5–CEQ-6 (2013), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-eop-budget1.pdf. 
 43. Craig & Ruhl, supra note 1, at 8. 
 44. Accordingly, in the draft amendment language in my Appendix, I propose CEQ as the out-
side agency. If a legislature believes that a wide range of agencies will pursue adaptive management in the 
near future, it makes more sense to create a new agency that focuses primarily on adaptive management. 
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of that agency will not be amenable to focusing on adaptive management. Howev-
er, the ad hoc nature of review panels has corresponding weaknesses—lack of insti-
tutional memory; the lack of an institution that can fight for funding in the appro-
priations arena; and the possibility of high variance in the nature and quality of 
reviews, given the lack of an institutional mandate, mission, or accountability.
45
 
My proposal for an expert, outside reviewing agency is my most tentative 
suggestion.
46
 My goal here is to facilitate consistent, high-quality adaptive man-
agement plans and programs, and to reduce the need for courts to attempt to resolve 
these disputes without expert, outside assessments. However, if guidelines are not 
helpful and the creation of a central expert body is not feasible—for instance, be-
cause the practice of adaptive management is so context-specific—then there is no 
helpful role to be played by an outside agency. My amendments are written so that 
any such outside agency (whether CEQ or a new agency) has the power—but no 
obligation—to draft guidelines. I have also written the amendments so that if the 
outside agency fails to provide, within a statutorily mandated time frame, an as-
sessment of the adaptive management proposal or plan, or of citizen petitions to 
terminate an adaptive management program, then the court would proceed to re-
view the relevant dispute as if no outside review had occurred (i.e., under the de-
fault standards that would apply in any case). 
IV. ENSURING FIDELITY TO KEY REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESSFUL 
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT 
Again, the purpose of giving agencies greater flexibility is to encourage them 
to do effective adaptive management—which in part requires ensuring that the reg-
ulatory or management decision making process in question is suitable for adaptive 
management. An important effort to ensure this suitability is incorporated in the 
first stage of Craig and Ruhl’s proposed process—the proposal stage, where the 
agency must demonstrate that adaptive management is appropriate for the questions 
the agency seeks to answer. 
There are some important requirements for successful adaptive management 
that I would add to the list of criteria for evaluating agency proposals in this first 
stage.
47
 First, adaptive management is only appropriate when the risks of adverse 
outcomes from adaptive management are neither too large nor irreversible.
48
 I 
would explicitly require a finding by the agency that the adaptive management pro-
                                                          
 45. Some of these downsides could be reduced if the peer review process was coordinated and 
supervised by a small staff at an existing agency. Another potential way to provide more institutional sup-
port for ad hoc review is the process by which the EPA, pursuant to section 309 of the Clean Air Act, pro-
vides reviews of environmental impact statements by other agencies. Agencies might be tasked with re-
viewing adaptive management programs within their area of special knowledge, either using their own staff 
or assembling ad hoc peer review panels. 
 46. In the draft language I focus on the option of creating a separate agency. However, one could 
adjust that draft language to accommodate the ad hoc panel approach. 
 47. Here I draw on the discussion in Craig and Ruhl’s article, as well as my own work. See 
Craig & Ruhl, supra note 1, at 19–21; Biber, supra note 1, at 944–45, 947. 
 48. See Craig & Ruhl, supra note 1, at 19; Biber, supra note 1, at 947. 
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Second, adaptive management is only useful if decision makers actually have 
some control over the system they are attempting to manage.
50
 If the system is out-
side of human control, then the improved knowledge that adaptive management 
might provide isn’t particularly useful, because we really can’t do any management 
anyway. Even more fundamentally, if the system is outside human control, it’s un-
likely that there is any management that can be examined or investigated through 
adaptive management. For instance, if we plan to use simultaneous multiple man-
agement options to determine whether there are different resource outcomes across 
those options, we actually won’t get much useful information if there is no connec-
tion between management and resource outcomes.
51
 I would explicitly require a 
finding by the agency that the complex system being managed is susceptible to 
human control or management (or that we are unsure whether the complex system 
is susceptible to human control or management, and adaptive management will 
help us determine whether control or management is possible). 
Third, adaptive management is, at heart, about producing useful information 
about how management or regulatory choices affect resource outcomes. If useful 
information will not be produced from the adaptive management program, it seems 
unlikely that the benefits of adaptive management will outweigh its costs.
52
 I would 
explicitly require a finding by the agency that adaptive management may produce 
useful information that would improve future management of the complex system 
in the future. 
V. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS: 
In paragraph 2(D)(2), add after subparagraph (h): 
“i. involves a system susceptible to human control or management, or alterna-
tively involves a system for which it is uncertain whether that system is susceptible 
to human control or management and adaptive management may help resolve that 
uncertainty; 
                                                          
 49. There may well be some difficulty of fully doing this analysis in the first stage. Thus, I 
would make clear that an agency’s finding at this initial stage can be made conditional on developing in the 
adaptive management plan adequate triggers or other plan components to adequately minimize risk to sys-
tem components. I also accordingly would add this risk factor to the standards used to evaluate the agency’s 
adaptive management plan in the second stage, including development of the monitoring plan and indica-
tors. I believe these changes are consistent with the requirements already proposed by Craig and Ruhl that 
adaptive management plans must identify “potential stressors and perturbations to the managed system.” 
Craig & Ruhl, supra note 1, at 52. 
 50. Id. at 19. 
 51. Of course, we may not know yet that there is no connection between management options 
and resource outcomes. In that case, adaptive management would be quite useful to demonstrate the lack of 
controllability. However, if we know that this is the case already, adaptive management is not helpful.  
 52. See Craig & Ruhl, supra note 1, at 19–20 (rightfully emphasizing that if a system is not dy-
namic enough, there is no informational gain to be had from adaptive management, since future predictions 
will be generally accurate); Biber, supra note 1, at 944–45 (another possible reason that we may not get 
useful information from an adaptive management system is that systems may be too dynamic to allow for 
useful learning to occur). 
It is also important that the specific measures proposed in the adaptive management plan will reduce 
uncertainty. Thus, I would add this requirement to the standards for approving adaptive management plans 
as well. 
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j. does not involve a system whose important components would be subject to 
a significant risk of major, irreversible damage from adaptive management. (In 
making this determination the agency may rely on the use of monitoring, indica-
tors, and management measures in any future adaptive management plan.); 
k. involves a system for which adaptive management may provide a substan-
tial reduction in uncertainty about the functioning of the system.” 
In section 2, add after subsection (E): 
“(F) During the public comment period for the rulemaking pursuant to 5 
U.S.C. § 553 [state equivalent statute], the Council on Environmental Quality [state 
equivalent] may review the agency’s findings with respect to paragraph (D)(2). The 
Council may, within the timeframe for public comment, provide an assessment of 
whether the agency’s findings are consistent with the requirements of paragraph 
(D)(2). Any such assessment shall contain specific findings about how and why the 
agency’s findings are consistent with the requirements of paragraph (D)(2). The 
Council may draw on regulations promulgated pursuant to section 7 of this Act in 
its assessment, including regulations promulgated by the agency itself. Any as-
sessment by the Council shall be made public concurrently with the promulgation 
of the final rule by the agency. A court conducting judicial review pursuant to § 
6(A) shall give substantial weight to the Council’s assessment in determining 
whether the agency’s findings meet the requirements of this Act. The Council may 
provide feedback and informal consultation to the agency prior to the public com-
ment period. A failure by the Council to provide an assessment within the public 
comment period shall not be deemed by a reviewing court to be an assessment that 
the findings are or are not consistent with the requirements of paragraph (D)(2).” 
In subsection 3(A), add after paragraph (2): 
“(3) During the public comment period for the rulemaking pursuant to 5 
U.S.C. § 553 [state equivalent statute], the Council on Environmental Quality [state 
equivalent] may review the proposed initial adaptive management plan. The Coun-
cil may, within the timeframe for public comment, provide an assessment of 
whether the plan meets the requirements of subsection (B) and this Act. Any such 
assessment shall contain specific findings about how and why the plan meets the 
requirements of subsection (B) and this Act. It shall also specifically identify the 
requirements of subsection (B) that the plan satisfies and the requirements the plan 
does not satisfy. The Council may draw on regulations promulgated pursuant to 
section 7 of this Act in its assessment, including regulations promulgated by the 
agency itself. Any assessment by the Council shall be made public concurrently 
with the promulgation of the final rule by the agency. A court conducting judicial 
review pursuant to § 6(B) of the initial adaptive management plan shall give sub-
stantial weight to the Council’s assessment in determining whether the plan meets 
the requirements of subsection (B) and this Act. The Council may provide feedback 
and informal consultation to the agency on any adaptive management plan being 
developed prior to the public comment period. A failure by the Council to provide 
an assessment within the public comment period shall not be deemed by a review-
ing court to be an assessment that the plan meets or does not meet the requirements 
of subsection (B) or this Act.” 
In paragraph 3(B)(1), insert after subparagraph (c), and renumber according-
ly: 
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“d. the important components of the system that it is managing, and any sig-
nificant risks of major, irreversible damage to those components.” 
In subparagraph 3(B)(1)(e) (as renumbered), amend to read: 
“e. the relationships among (a), (b), (c), and (d).” 
In paragraph 3(B)(1), insert after renumbered subparagraph f: 
“g. the uncertainty that the adaptive management plan seeks to reduce.” 
In paragraph 3(B)(3), amend subparagraph (a) to read: 
“the system indicators that will or could reveal the existing and changing rela-
tionships among the agency’s management goals; threats, stressors, and perturba-
tions of the system; significant risks of major, irreversible damage to important 
system components; and the agency’s proposed management measures;” 
In paragraph 3(B)(3), amend subparagraph (g) to read: 
“changes in indicator status that would indicate a negative change in the sys-
tem being managed (i.e., a change that retards the ultimate or immediate manage-
ment goals or that indicates a significant risk of major, irreversible damage to im-
portant system components) and at least one means of determining whether such 
changes are caused by management measures that the agency has implemented.” 
In section 3(B)(5), add after subparagraph (e): 
“f. how the management measures will prevent any significant risks of major, 
irreversible damage to important system components; and 
g. how the management measures may reduce uncertainty about the system.” 
Amend paragraph 3(C)(2) to read: 
“(2) Notice of Termination. The agency shall publish notice of its intention to 
terminate the implementation of its initial adaptive management plan in the Federal 
Register [state equivalent]. Unless judicial review of the agency’s decision is 
sought, the agency shall, at least thirty-one (31) days but not more than ninety (90) 
days after publication of the Federal Register termination notice, terminate imple-
mentation of the initial adaptive management plan. The agency may choose to 
adopt a new adaptive management plan pursuant to § 4 of this Act. Judicial review 
of the agency’s decision to terminate shall be in accordance with § 6.” 
Delete subsection 3(C)(4). 
Amend subsection 4(A) to read: 
“(A)(1) After completion or termination of an initial or subsequent adaptive 
management plan, an agency may choose to adopt a subsequent adaptive manage-
ment plan, unless: 
Congress [the legislature] has expressly and specifically required that the 
agency terminate the adaptive management track for the project, management ac-
tion, or category of projects and management actions at issue; or 
Congress [the legislature] required the agency to pursue the adaptive man-
agement track and the system has achieved the system status, indicator statuses, or 
management goals that Congress [the legislature] specified must be achieved in 
order for the adaptive management track to be terminated. 
At least every six years after the adoption of an initial adaptive management 
plan, the agency shall make the findings required by § 2(D)(2). 
At least every six years after the adoption of an initial adaptive management 
plan, the agency shall make a finding that any adoption of a subsequent adaptive 
management plan shall be consistent with any relevant statutes, regulations, or ex-
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ecutive orders otherwise precluded from consideration by paragraph (C)(4) of this 
section. 
Findings pursuant to paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subsection shall be re-
viewable by a court in accordance with § 6 of this Act as if the agency had made an 
initial decision to place a project on the adaptive management track and as if the 
agency had adopted an initial adaptive management plan. Findings pursuant to par-
agraphs (2) and (3) of this subsection shall be made using the notice-and-comment 
(“informal”) rulemaking procedures of 5 U.S.C. § 553 [state equivalent statute], 
except that the exceptions noted in that provision shall not apply to any decision 
made under this section. Findings pursuant to paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subsec-
tion may be made concurrently with an agency’s adoption of a subsequent adaptive 
management plan and a single rulemaking may be made for the findings and adop-
tion of a subsequent adaptive management plan. If the findings pursuant to para-
graphs (2) and (3) of this subsection are negative, the agency shall either remove 
the project, management action, or category of projects or management actions 
from the adaptive management track pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (5) or 
shall proceed to develop a revised subsequent adaptive management plan that 
would permit the agency to make positive findings pursuant to paragraphs (2) and 
(3) of this subsection.  Any such revised subsequent adaptive management plan 
must be accompanied by the appropriate findings pursuant to paragraphs (2) and 
(3) of this subsection. 
An agency’s decision not to adopt a subsequent adaptive management plan af-
ter completion or termination of an initial or subsequent adaptive management 
plan, and therefore to remove a project, management action, or category of projects 
or management actions from the adaptive management track shall be reviewable by 
a court in accordance with § 6 of this Act. Any such decision shall be made through 
a notice-and-comment (“informal”) rulemaking pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 553 [state 
statutory equivalent], except that the exceptions noted in that provision shall not 
apply to any decision made under this section. Any such decision may be made 
concurrent with the appropriate findings under paragraphs (2) and (3) of this sub-
section and a single rulemaking may be made for those findings and the decision to 
remove a project, management action, or category of projects or management ac-
tions from the adaptive management track.” 
In subsection 4(B), add after paragraph (2), and renumber the subsequent par-
agraphs accordingly: 
“(3) During the public comment period for the rulemaking pursuant to 5 
U.S.C. § 553 [state equivalent statute], the Council on Environmental Quality [state 
equivalent] may review the proposed subsequent adaptive management plan. The 
Council may, within the timeframe for public comment, provide an assessment of 
whether the plan meets the requirements of paragraph (4) of this subsection and this 
Act. Any such assessment shall contain specific findings about how and why the 
plan meets the requirements of paragraph (4) of this subsection and this Act. It shall 
also specifically identify the requirements of paragraph (4) of this subsection that 
the plan satisfies and the requirements the plan does not satisfy. The Council may 
draw on regulations promulgated pursuant to section 7 of this Act in its assessment, 
including regulations promulgated by the agency itself. Any assessment by the 
Council shall be made public concurrently with the promulgation of the final rule 
by the agency. A court conducting judicial review pursuant to § 6(B) of the subse-
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quent adaptive management plan shall give substantial weight to the Council’s as-
sessment in determining whether the plan meets the requirements of paragraph (4) 
of this subsection and this Act. The Council may provide feedback and informal 
consultation to the agency on any adaptive management plan being developed prior 
to the public comment period. A failure by the Council to provide an assessment 
within the public comment period shall not be deemed by a reviewing court to be 
an assessment that the plan meets or does not meet the requirements of paragraph 
(4) of this subsection or this Act.” 
Amend paragraph 4(C)(2) to read: 
“(2) Notice of Termination. The agency shall publish notice of its intention to 
terminate the implementation of its current adaptive management plan in the Feder-
al Register [state equivalent]. Unless judicial review of the agency’s decision is 
sought, the agency shall, at least thirty-one (31) days but not more than ninety (90) 
days after publication of the Federal Register termination notice, terminate imple-
mentation of the adaptive management plan. The agency may choose to adopt a 
new adaptive management plan pursuant to § 4 of this Act. Judicial review of the 
agency’s decision to terminate shall be in accordance with § 6.” 
Amend paragraph (4)(C)(4) to begin “Except as provided in paragraph 
(A)(1)(3) of this section . . .” 
Amend subsection 5(B) to read: 
“(B) If the implementing agency concludes on the basis of its ongoing moni-
toring data that the system has achieved the abort indicators specified in the adap-
tive management plan, the agency shall, unless the agency can attribute those sta-
tuses to the occurrence of an unexpected and temporary perturbation to the system 
whose effects are not expected to be permanent or long lasting, immediately pub-
lish notice of its intention to terminate the implementation of that plan in the Feder-
al Register [state equivalent].  Unless judicial review of the agency’s decision is 
sought, the agency shall, at least thirty-one (31) days but not more than ninety (90) 
days after publication of the Federal Register termination notice, terminate imple-
mentation of the adaptive management plan. The agency may choose to adopt a 
new adaptive management plan pursuant to § 4 of this Act. Judicial review of the 
agency’s decision to terminate shall be in accordance with § 6.” 
Delete from subsection 5(C) “by clear and convincing evidence.” 
Amend paragraph 5(C)(1) to read: 
“(1) the system has been subjected to a ‘severe disruption,’ defined as chang-
es in the complex system being managed that were not identified or anticipated in 
the currently applicable adaptive management plan and that are likely to result in 
significant risks of major and irreversible harm to important components of the 
complex system being managed by the adaptive management program.” 
Amend subsection 5(D) to read: 
“(D) Any person may file a petition for mandamus in the U.S. District Court 
for the district in which the agency project or management action is occurring [state 
court], or in any U.S. District Court for a district in which the agency may be found 
[alternative state court]. Prior to filing the petition, the petitioner must give ninety 
(90) days’ notice of the petition to the agency and the Council on Environmental 
Quality [state equivalent], including a full copy of the allegations in the petition 
and supporting documentation that the criteria in paragraphs (1), (2) and (4) have 
been met. The Council may review the petition and provide, at the end of ninety 
2014] NREL EDITION 277 
 
(90) days, an assessment of whether the petition demonstrates, by clear and con-
vincing evidence, that the criteria in paragraphs (1), (2), and (4) have been met. The 
reviewing court shall give substantial weight to the assessment by the Council in 
reviewing the petition for mandamus. The Council’s failure to provide an assess-
ment shall not be deemed by a reviewing court to be a finding that a petition does 
or does not meet the criteria in paragraphs (1), (2) and (4). The reviewing court 
shall grant the petition if the petitioner can prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that:” 
Delete paragraph 5(D)(4). Renumber the remaining paragraphs in this subsec-
tion accordingly. 
Amend subsection 5(E) to read: 
“(E) Any person may file a petition for mandamus in the U.S. District Court 
for the district in which the agency project or management action is occurring [state 
court], or in any U.S. District Court for a district in which the agency may be found 
[alternative state court]. Prior to filing the petition, the petitioner must give ninety 
(90) days’ notice of the petition to the agency and the Council on Environmental 
Quality [state equivalent], including a full copy of the allegations in the petition 
and supporting documentation that the criteria in paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and (5) 
have been met. The Council may review the petition and provide, at the end of 
ninety (90) days, an assessment of whether the petition demonstrates, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that the criteria in paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (5) have been 
met. The reviewing court shall give substantial weight to the assessment by the 
Council in reviewing the petition for mandamus. The Council’s failure to provide 
an assessment shall not be deemed by a reviewing court to be a finding that a peti-
tion does or does not meet the criteria in paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (5). The re-
viewing court shall grant the petition if the petitioner can prove by clear and con-
vincing evidence that:” 
Delete paragraph 5(E)(5). Renumber the remaining paragraphs in this subsec-
tion accordingly. 
Amend paragraph 5(E)(1) to read: 
“(1) the system has been subjected to a severe disruption, defined as changes 
in the complex system being managed that were not identified or anticipated in the 
currently applicable adaptive management plan and that are likely to result in sig-
nificant risks of major and irreversible harm to important components of the com-
plex system being managed by the adaptive management program.” 
In subsection 6(B) add after paragraph (2), and renumber subsequent para-
graphs accordingly: 
“(3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of 
statutory right, unless application of the relevant statute is otherwise precluded by 
this Act;” 
Amend subsection 6(E) to read: 
“(E) Any person may challenge an agency’s decision to terminate the imple-
mentation of an adaptive management plan pursuant to §§ 3(C)(1), 4(C)(1), 5(B), 
or 5(C) of this Act within thirty (30) days of the agency’s publication in the Federal 
Register [state equivalent] of its decision to terminate in the U.S. District Court for 
the district in which the agency project or management action is occurring [state 
court] or in any U.S. District Court for a district in which the agency may be found 
[alternative state court]. The court shall reverse the agency’s decision to terminate 
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and shall reinstate the previously operative adaptive management plan if it finds 
that the agency’s decision to terminate does not satisfy the requirements of §§ 
3(C)(1), 4(C)(1), 5(B), or 5(C) or is otherwise found to meet the criteria in para-
graphs (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) of subsection (B).” 
Add at the end of subsection 6(F) the following language: 
“A failure to comply with monitoring or reporting requirements under this 
subsection includes trivial compliance by the agency.” 
Add at the end of subsection 6(G) the following language: 
“A failure to implement an adaptive management plan under this subsection 
includes trivial compliance by the agency with monitoring or reporting require-
ments, or trivial implementation by the agency of the adaptive management plan.” 
Add after section 6: 
“section 7: Council on Environmental Quality [state equivalent] Regulations 
(A) The Council on Environmental Quality [state equivalent] may promulgate 
regulations to implement this Act. Those regulations may include: 
Guidelines to assist agencies with the determination under § 2(D) as to 
whether projects, management actions, or categories of projects or management 
actions are suitable for the adaptive management track. Such guidelines may be 
used by courts in judicial review of rules promulgated under § 2(E) and the find-
ings under § 4(A)(2) of this Act. 
Guidelines to assist agencies with the development of adaptive management 
plans pursuant to § 3 and § 4 of this Act. Such guidelines may be used by courts in 
judicial review of rules promulgated under § 3(A)(1) and § 4(B)(1) of this Act and 
findings under § 4(A)(3) of this Act. 
(B) The regulations promulgated pursuant to subsection (A) may also include 
requirements that agencies develop their own guidelines. Such agency-specific 
guidelines may also be used by courts to review relevant determinations under this 
Act.” 
